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Massacre 
highlights 
Timorese 
plight 
East Timor became world news in 
November when Indonesian troops 
fired on a funeral procession at the 
Santa Cruz cemetery, Dill, the 
territory's capital, killing up to 200 
people. The incident tragically 
highlighted an injustice long ignored 
by much of the international 
community. 
The massacre followed a period of 
mounting tension in the former 
Portuguese colony, illegally occupied 
by Indonesia since 1975, with reports 
pointing to an escalating campaign of 
Indonesian repression in the run-up to 
a planned delegation of Portuguese 
parliamentarians in November. The 
delegation was called off on 24 October 
after Portuguese concern at Indonesia's 
attempts to control and manipulate the 
visit. 
This issue of Timor Link looks at the 
varying accounts of the Santa Cruz 
massacre and the background to it, 
focusing on its international 
repercussions. 
The Santa Cruz massacre on 12 November 
came after a memorial mass for Sebastiao 
Gomes, a youth shot dead by troops in an 
incident at Motael Church on 28 October. 
As the mourners approached the Santa Cruz 
cemetery to place flowers on his grave, 
soldiers appeared and opened fire on the 
procession. Among those killed was New 
Zealander Kamal Bamadhaj. 
The tragedy has caused international 
outrage, the more so as it was witnessed by 
several foreign visitors who have been able 
to publicise their testimonies. Below we 
contrast their eye-witness accounts with the 
official claims of the Indonesian military. 
Foreign accounts 
US journalists Allan Nairn of the New Yorker 
magazine and Amy Goodman of the New 
York radio station WBAI were in East Timor 
to report on alleged human rights abuses, 
and were badly beaten by troops while the 
shooting was going on. 
According to Nairn: 'It was ... a planned 
and systematic massacre .... This was not a 
situation where you had some hothead who 
ran amok .... ' As the people saw the troops, 
he said, 'they tried to shrink back. There 
was a small collective gasp in the crowd. 
As the soldiers turned the corner they raised 
their M16s and began all at once firing into 
the crowd .... 
'Amy and I went out and stood between 
the soldiers and the crowd because if they 
saw foreigners there with cameras with tape 
recorders they wouldn't shoot. That didn't 
work.' 
Amy Goodman added: 'There was 
absolutely no warning .... I couldn't believe 
they would fire on this crowd - kids who 
were five years old .. .. These were truly 
defenceless people. They had nothing but 
some banners ... and the commemorative 
cloth that they had for this young man, 
Sebastiao, and they just kept shooting. 
'With us they beat us into a corner and, 
sitting on the ground, the only thing we 
could say was "Please, we're from 
America. " .. . I kept thinking that the guns 
pointed on us.. . were also from America 
because the United States provides weapons 
for the Indonesian army. 
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'I turned around - tremendous amount 
of gun fire -- and there were dozens of 
people lying in the streets. ' 
Bob Muntz, South East Asia project officer 
with Australia 's Community Aid Abroad, 
was also present and managed to escape. 
On return to Melbourne he told a press 
conference: 'It was a case of sustained 
automatic weapon fire from many, many 
guns for a full two minutes into a crowded 
street that had almost a thousand people in 
it with no possibility of cover ... 
'For all the time I was at the rally ... I 
observed an orderly crowd of people 
enthusiastically chanting their slogans, 
displaying their banners, but doing nothing 
that could be described as provocative 
towards the Indonesians .. . 
'There was no doubt that the attack was 
premeditated, unprovoked and well 
planned .. .. I can say categorically that the 
claims of the Indonesian forces are nothing 
but lies designed to cover up the most 
appalling atrocity that has been perpetrated 
on the people of Timor for many years'. 
British cameraman Max Stahl, of 
Yorkshire Television, whose film revealed 
the truth of the massacre, wrote a graphic 
account of the event in the Independent on 
Sunday on 17 November. Like the other 
eye-witnesses, he emphasised the peaceful 
nature of the march and the brutality of the 
military's assault: '. .. there was no riot. There 
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was a procession. a demonstration of 
except ional h· good order. e\·en good 
humour, despite the fear of the pan icipants. 
All the provocation the military needed \\'as 
in the pro-independence h;:mners and 
slogans of the demonstrators. and in the ir 
temerity in demonstrating at :.111' . 
Arrested and detained by the police afte r 
burying his film in the graveyard, Stahl was 
held for nine hours. '\\'hy , I asked had they 
carried out this barbarous killing. Why did 
they need guns :.1t a ll when the 
demonstrators had non6" 
Indonesia's claims 
Head of the Indonesian armed forces, 
General Try Sutrisno, initially put the death 
to ll at about 50 with 20 wounded and denied 
that any fore igners were among the victims. 
Blaming separatists for the army shooting, 
the general claimed that 'hand grenades, 
guns and knives' had been seized and that 
the crowd w hich left Motael church had 
been 'yelling hysterically, pelting shops and 
a police post. ' 
'The security forces,' he went on , 'tried 
hut failed to impose order through 
sympathetic and persuasive means .... The 
mass was so brutal that it led to victims. The 
deputy commander of military sector 700, 
Major Gerhan Lantara , was stabbed and the 
situation became more chaotic. Preventative 
actions were first taken ... unril finally the 
situation had to be restored .... ' 
Try accused the Catholic Church of 
instigating the protest , adding that the 
church, as a place of sanctity, 'should not 
be misused to create disorder.· 
According to Reuters , Majo r General 
Sintong Panjaitan, the regional commander, 
told the Indonesian media : 'The authorities 
will never he in any doubt about taking 
tough action aga inst any kind of abuse of 
our pe rsuasive approach. The only order is: 
to kill o r to be killed.' 
On 14 November official Indonesian army 
figures for the death toll were revised 
downwards to 19 dead and 91 injured . 
General Try, while regretting the incident , 
said that ' it must be realised that they 
[fighte rs aga inst Indonesian rule] are brutal. ' 
He sa id an investigation would be held , but 
stated that the affair was a domestic 
concern. 'We hope that foreign countries 
will nor meddle in the internal affairs of 
Indonesia because this involves the 
sovere ignty of Indonesia.· 
Also annou ncing an investigation , the 
foreign minister, Ali Alatas , said that those 
responsible for the shooting would be 
punished 'according to the law ·. 'This [the 
shooting] is not something which the 
government has ordered or condoned. · 
Brigadie r Rudolf Warouw, the East Timor 
military commander, explained the shooting 
as 'a misunderstanding by the soldiers' who 
shot 'because of the tension'. He admitted 
bis men \Vere at fault and said the dead had 
bee n buried immediately in unmarked 
graves in a deserted cemetery on the 
outskirts of Dili . He also confirmed that 
Kamal Bamadhaj \Yas among the dead. 
Despite expressions of regret, however, 
General Try was also quoted in the Jakarta 
daily jayakarta of 14 November as saying, 
at a meeting of Lemhanas (National Defence 
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Institute) graduates. that 'these despicable 
people [pro-independence demonstrato rs) 
must be sho t'. 
On 9 December, as an official Indonesian 
comm1ss1on of inquiry began its 
investigation of the events of 12 November, 
Try was equally candid: 'Once the 
investigation is accomplished, we will wipe 
out all separatist e lements who have tainted 
the government's dignity .' 
Official inquiry 
As Timar Link went to press, Indonesia 
released its preliminary report on the 
massacre. It contradicted army claims that 
only 19 people had died, upping the figure 
to 50 dead and 90 disappeared. 
Refe rring to 'soldiers without any 
command control ' and 'exercising self-
defence', the report describes the 
'provocative savagery' of the demonstrators 
whom, it alleges, were forced to attend the 
demonstration. It disowns the accounts of 
atrocities committed after the massacre. 
Western governments appear to have 
generally welcomed the inquiry 's findings . 
The US State Department said that the 
commission 'appears to have taken a serious 
and responsible approach', while the 
Australian foreign minister, Gareth Evans, 
agreed with its estimates of the death toll. 
But Amnesty International has expressed 
serious doubts about the credibility of the 
report and called for an independent United 
Nations inquiry. 
Chronology of events 
21 October: Bishop Belo, Apostolic 
Administrator of Dili diocese, speaks on 
Portuguese radio of his fears for the 
safety of the Timorese as the date for the 
Portuguese parliamentary delegation to 
East Timor approaches. 
25 October: Portuguese delegation 
·suspended' after Indonesia vetoes an 
Australian journalist, Jill Jol1iffe, chosen 
by the parliamentarians as a member of 
the foreign press team. Reports of rising 
tension in Dili . 
28 October: Motael church incident in 
which a youth , Sebastiao Gomes is shot 
dead. Alfonso Henrique, an informer of 
the Intel secret police, is stabbed to 
death. 
Tension continues to rise in early 
November as repression continues. 
12 November: Massacre at the Santa 
Cruz Cemetery, Dili, where over 100 
mourners of Sebastiao Gomes are shot 
dead by the Indonesian military. 
In the following days and weeks, 
governments around the world demand 
an explanation from Indonesia. 
Embarrassed foreign minister Alatas 
flounders , as the Indonesian army 
attempts to justify its actions. 
16 November: Reports of a second 
massacre in Bernos, East Timor, of up to 
80 witnesses of the Santa Cruz massacre. 
19 November: 70 people arrested in the 
Indonesian capital Jakarta during a 
peaceful demonstration against the Santa 
Cruz killings. Three weeks later 21 were 
still detained incommunicado; Amnesty 
International expresses concern for their 
safety. 
23-25 November: Reports from East 
Timor tell of an atmosphere of terror 
worse than at any time since the 1975 
Indonesian invasion. Bishop Belo pleads 
for help. Virtually all phone links with 
the outside world are cut off. 
The military mocks the threat of US 
pressure, pointing to Washington's 
failure to follow up expressions of 
concern at the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
massacre in China with concrete action. 
It claims the massacre will soon be 
forgotten and threatens to kill all East 
Timorese youth. 
Widespread threats against the Catholic 
Church throughout Indonesia. The 
Vatican maintains a cautious silence, 
worried at the position of the church in 
a predominantly Muslim country. 
27 November: Reports received from 
East Timar that Indonesia is killing 
people every day. Hope expressed that 
'if the United States tells the Indonesians 
to stop, the rest of the world will follow'. 
9 December: Arrests continue with the 
church under massive Indonesian 
pressure. Church contacts say 
international pressure has nevertheless 
helped and that US pressure, in 
particular, has reduced the number of 
killings that week. 
19 December: The Indonesian Bishops 
Conference calls for clemency for 
Timorese demonstrators under arrest and 
facing the death penalty on charges of 
subversion in connection with the Dili 
demonstration. 
27 December: Official Indonesian 
inquiry makes public its findings. 
EAST TIMOR: 
A forgotten issue 
Timar, area 7,400 square miles, is one of the 
easternmost islands of the Indonesian 
archipelago and lies 300 miles north of 
Australia, its nearest neigbour. The western 
part of the island formerly a Dutch colony, 
belongs to Indonesia , whereas East Timor 
was for more than 400 years a Portuguese 
colony. 
In 1974 Portugal decolonised East Timor 
and the territory's newly formed political 
parties began discussing options for the 
future federation with Portugal, 
independence, or integration with 
Indo nesia. 
The Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) 
initially favoured the first option but then 
jo ined a coalition with the nationalist 
libe ration movement Fretil in to demand 
independence and call for a rejection of 
colonialism and racial discrimination. A 
third party, Apodeti , w ith a small political 
base in the country, was used as a vehicle 
for Indonesian propaganda and pressure in 
favour of integration . 
On 11 August 1975 the UDT staged a 
coup to pre-empt Indonesian threats to 
intervene if Fretilin came to power. In the 
ensuing civil war 1,500 people lost the ir 
lives . By September 1975, however, Fretilin 
was in control of virtually all of Portuguese 
Timor, fo llowing defection of Timorese 
colonial troops to the liberation movement's 
side. 
Indonesia, like the United States , was 
worried by the proximity of an independent 
state with radical policies and continued to 
threaten East Timor, despite previous 
assurances that Jakarta would respect the 
right of the East Timorese to independence. 
In September 1975 Indonesia closed West 
Timor to journalists and on 7 December it 
launched a fu ll-scale invasion of East Timor 
with the knowledge of the United States and 
the encouragement of Australia. East Timar 
was proclaimed the '27th province ' of 
Indonesia. 
The invasion and annexation of East 
Timor has been brutal: up to 200,000 
people, a third of the population , have died 
as a result of Indonesian rule. But the 
majority of Timorese have not accepted 
subjugation; Indonesia has been unable to 
eliminate the desire of the East Timorese for 
self-determination and an armed resistance 
movement still remains in the hills, albeit in 
dwindling numbers. 
Although the invasion has been 
condemned by successive United Nations 
resolutions, the international community 
has done little or nothing to implement 
them, given the major economic and 
geopolitical interests of the United States, 
Japan and particularly Australia in the 
region. Indonesia's crucial strategic location 
and regional status - it has the world's fifth 
largest population and large reserves of oil 
and other natural resources - have all 
encouraged the world powers to downplay 
East Timor's agony. 
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Hopes das 
as Portugal 
suspends 
delegation 
East Timor's hopes for an 
internationally-backed path to 
independence were dealt a severe blow 
on 24 October when a Portuguese 
parliamentary delegation, due to begin 
an 11-day mission on 4 November, was 
forced to suspend its visit. 
Portugal, the former colonial ruler 
of East Timor, is still considered the 
'administering power' by the United 
Nations and the delegation's imminent 
arrival had led to growing optimism 
that it might be the first step towards a 
peaceful settlement. This article, 
written by KIRSlY SWORD, a 
researcher who recently visited East 
Timor, looks at the fear and excitement 
generated by the cancelled Portuguese 
visit. 
'We are hoping for great things from this 
parl iamentary visit.. .. We are currently 
preparing to appeal to the Portuguese 
government to return to Timar and to take 
on its responsibilities. We have faith that 
Portugal will accept our invitation because 
Timor is the last of its sons. If the Portuguese 
go back after this visit and wash their hands 
of their national responsibilities, we will all 
be exterminated . We will remain here , 
helpless and without any protection 
whatsoever. ' 
These words of an East Timorese student, 
spoken in September 1991, summed up the 
expectation surrounding the Portuguese 
delegation and pointed to the anguish fe lt 
at its last-minute suspension. 
When I visited East Timor in July 1990 the 
hopes of the East Timorese for 
independence had risen high by the 
prospect of the de legation. During my 
week's visi t, I was frequently approached 
by people of all ages and asked about the 
likelihood of the visit taking place. At that 
time no date or terms had yet been agreed 
by either Portugal or Indonesia. 
When I returned in September 1991 the 
same anticipation was evident everywhere 
I went, only this time there was no doubt 
in anyone's mind that the delegation would 
go ahead as planned. At the same time , 
however, the Indonesian authorities began 
a campaign of repression and intimidation 
to silence the local population . 
Entire villages were affected and civil 
servants, students and teachers, in 
particular, were threatened w ith the loss of 
their jobs, if not their lives, if they expressed 
the ir political aspirations to the delegation. 
A man in Ossu told us of an incident in 
Nahareka village on 18 September w hen the 
Indonesian Battalion 406 threatened to kill 
every local between the ages of 10 and 45. 
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The repn::ssion led Bishop Carlos Belo, 
the Apostolic Administrator, and East 
Timorese resistance leader Xanana Gusmao 
to ell\ for an international peace-keeping 
force to he installed during and after the 
visit. Their appeal for foreign support led 
6·1 bishops from around the world to send 
a lettt:r to the United Nations secretary-
general , _l;1Yie r Perez de Cue llar, o n 2-t 
October (see 'Foreign bishops', p.7). 
Fears for the safl:'ty of the Timorese 
people \Yt:re certainly a factor in the 
decision of the Portuguese delegation to 
suspend it s \·isit. 
Background 
In 1983 the UN General Assemhly requested 
the secretary-gene ral to secure a settlement 
of the East Timor issue and since then 
Portugal had been negotiating with the 
Jakarta government for access to the 
country. Negotiations over the Portuguese 
parliamentary delegation , spo nsored by the 
UN, began three yea rs ago and proved 
problematic, given the differing inte rests of 
the various parties concerned. 
As the first official Portuguese visit since 
Ponugal's hasty withdrawal from the 
te rrito1y 16 yea rs ago, the delegatio n had 
been seen by the East Timorese as an 
important landmark in their struggle for 
independence and as a step towards a 
solution of the prolonged dispute by the 
inte rnational community. 
J1kana , o n the other hand , confident that 
repression and the econom ic inte rests of its 
major Western trading pa1tners wou ld allow 
the status quo in Indonesia 's '27th province ' 
to he maintained , saw the visit as a means 
of ga ining international recognition fo r 
Indo nesian control. With this aim in mind, 
in March 1988 the Jakarta government 
invited a Portuguese delega tion to visit 
Indonesia and East Timor. 
But it w~1s not until July 1989 that :1 
decisio n to send :1 delegation was finall y 
made and over two years o f negotiations 
on the te rms and protocol of the visit 
fo llowed . Between.July and September 1991 
Indonesian and Portuguesl:' government 
representati\·es met in New York under the 
ausp ices of the UN secreta1y-general and 
on l8 Septembe r the dates of 27 September 
and 2K October \Yere fixed respectively as 
a pro\·isional timetable for the departure of 
an adYance UN advance mission and the 
parliamentary delegation . 
According to an annex to UN Document 
·1 1--15 14560 on East Timor o f 13 September 
1991 , the stated purpose of the \·isit was to 
facilitate 'the achievement of a 
comprehensi\·e and internationally 
acceptable settleme nt of the question of 
East Timo r'. 
Suspension 
Lisbon-.~ officia l reason for the suspension 
of the delegation, announced by the 
chairman of the Portuguese parliament ten 
days before the parliamentarians and their 
entourage of U"l officials and media guests 
were due to depart for Dili , \\·as that it could 
not accept Indonesia 's decision to veto one 
of the foreign journalists chosen by the 
Portugue~e delegation to accompany its 
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missio n. Indonesia claimed that Lisbon-
hasecl Australian journalist Jill Jolliffe was a 
pro-independence activist and that her 
articles \You ld be b iased. 
But according to a jo int protocol agreed 
hy Portugal and Indonesia under UN 
auspices on the terms of the delegation's 
\·isit, neither party was at liberty to influence 
the composition o f media contingents. 
In the fo llowing days it became clear the 
Indonesian government was seeking to 
manipulate logistical arrangements in an 
effort to control the delegation 's freedom 
of movement , thus threatening its ability to 
investigate and the independence of its 
findings. Foreign te levision teams, for 
example, would have to transmit their 
footage via Jakarta and Indonesia had also 
insisted that the delegation should arrive in 
East Timor in an Indonesian aiiways 
aeroplane, instead of the Thai ai rcraft 
preferred by the Portuguese. 
Reactions 
Given East Timor's long-enforced isolation, 
news of the suspension was slow in 
reaching the people and it came via the 
Indonesian media. Indonesian foreign 
minister, Ali Alatas, denied that the veto on 
Jill Jolliffe was an Indonesian attempt to 
'complicate the visit' and expressed doubt 
as to the good will of the Portuguese 
parliament towards the people of Lisbon 's 
former colony. 
Views of the suspension varied both in 
East Timor and abroad . For the Timorese, 
unable to obtain balanced reporting of the 
reasons for the suspension, Portugal 's 
insistence that the visit sho uld not go ahead 
while the veto on Jill Jolliffe remained was 
seen as a shattering betrayal. This was also 
the view of some East Timor watchers 
further afield . Others, however, including 
some Portuguese government officials, felt 
that the parliamentary visit sho uld be 
completely shelved and energies re-
channelled into a new Portuguese 
diplomatic offensive through the UN. 
In an interview with the Portuguese 
newspaper 0Publicoof7 November, armed 
resistance leader Xanana Gusmao 
announced his movement's intention to 
continue the fight against Indonesian 
occupation, despite being 'stunned' by the 
news of the delegation 's suspension. 'We 
increasingly get the feeling that the solution 
should be found only by o urselves.' 
Student activists in Baucau echoed these 
sentiments in a Yorkshire Television 
interview in November: 'If the delegation 
doesn 't come, we will continue to fight. We 
are prepared to die for a just cause. We'll 
fight on, but people like you and your 
[British] government will have to help us 
because we have neither the power nor the 
weapons of the Indonesians'. 
The consequences of the delegation's 
suspension have indeed been explosive. 
Media evidence fuels 
international reaction 
With teams of foreign journalists 
present in East Timor for the 
Portuguese parliamentary delegation, 
it has been impossible for the 
international community to ignore the 
Santa Cruz massacre. It was Yorkshire 
Television footage, shown widely on 
prime-time television in Europe and the 
United States, which provided the 
world with the horrific evidence, 
casting major doubt on the Indonesian 
version of events. This article gives a 
round-up of the international reactions 
to the massacre. 
Portugal 
Noting that ·Not even the presence of the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture of the United 
Nations Commissio n on Human Rights acted 
as a deterrent ,' the Po11uguese government 
issued a strongly-worded statemenr on 12 
November which condemned 'this new act 
of utmost brutality ... against a defenceless 
civilian crowd ... · 
Describing the massacre as a result of 
Indonesia ·s ·continuing illegal occupation 
[of East Tima r], in disregard of the UN 
Charter and of General Assembly and 
Security Council resolutions,' the statement 
called on all states to pressure the Jakarta 
government to withdraw immediately from 
the territory and end repression; to demand 
an internationally-supervised investigation 
and access to the territory for humanitarian 
non-governmental organisations; and to 
monito r human rights developments so as 
to prevent further bloodshed. 
It added that Amnesty International had 
warned the inte rnational community in 
August of continuing human rights 
violations in East Tima r, including 
allegations of at least 30 extra-judicial 
killings by the Indonesian security forces in 
1990 and early 1991. 
The statement also stressed the special 
responsibility of the United Nations in 
achieving a solution in East Timor. Before 
the massacre President Mario Soares had 
sent a five-page lette r to Javier Perez de 
Cuellar, the UN secretary-general. The UN, 
he wrote , 'which took such a clear position 
on Kuwait, should condemn with the same 
vehemence the occupation and oppression 
to which Indonesia has subjected the people 
of East Tim or. · 
Spokesperson for the National Council of 
East Timorese Resistance, Jose Ramos Horta , 
in Lisbon at the time of the events in the 
Santa Cruz cemetery, sa id that Timorese had 
been refused access to the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, Peter Koojimans, in 
Dili at the time of the massacre. 
Following Indonesia 's nomination of a 
commission of inquiry entirely composed 
of former army officers and government-
linked figures, Portugal issued a second 
statement on 20 November. Noting that the 
commission was chaired by a Supreme 
Court Judge who was a reservist army 
general, it declared that the commission 
lacked any legitimacy and demanded an 
independent international investigation. 
Portugal declared 20 November a day of 
national mourning for the massacre victims. 
Flags were flown half-mast, newspapers 
were published with a black edge and 
church commerations were held. 
European Community 
In a resolution condemning the killings on 
21 November, the European Parliament 
demanded an 'immediate, thorough, 
impa1tial and internationally supervised 
investigation' to bring those responsible to 
trial. Urging the EC and the UN to impose 
an arms embargo on Indonesia, it called on 
the Council of Ministers to review co-
operation agreements with Indonesia and 
on ministers of EC member states to make 
strong representations to the Indoesian 
authorities . It also resolved to send a mission 
to a hearing on East Timor of the European 
Parliament's subcommittee on human rights, 
due to be held in Lisbon. 
In a statement issued on 25 November, 
the Council of Minsters expressed 'grave 
concern' at events in Dili and urged the 
Indonesian government to 'ensure that 
members of the Indonesian armed forces 
and police in East Timor refrain immediately 
from using violence' and that those 
responsible for the massacre be brought to 
trial. 
In another statement on 3 December, the 
Council of Ministers declared that co-
operation between the EC and Indonesia 
would be reviewed in the light of Jakarta's 
response to the Community's demands for 
a credible, independent investigation and 
for human rights to be respected. The 
statement reiterated the ministers' 
'condemnation of these unjustifiable actions 
by the armed forces of Indonesia '. 
On 13 November Denmark joined 
Canada in suspending aid to Indonesia and 
became the first EC member state to do so. 
Meanwhile, the Dutch government 
announced that the Netherlands would 
halt new aid to Indonesia, but existing 
projects would not be affected. Dutch aid 
to Indonesia in 1990 was more than US$200 
million. 
Britain 
The Indonesian ambassador was 
summoned to the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office to be told of the 
British government's 'concern ' at events in 
Dili. Otherwise the government did little to 
convince observers that Britain would take 
action against Indonesia, despite pressure 
from all the major parties in parliament. 
On 18 November the Overseas 
Development minister, Lynda Chalker, told 
the House of Commons that the 'good 
governance' criterion for the allocation of 
British aid applied to Indonesia. But, 
ignoring the assertion of fellow 
Conservative, Jim Lester MP, that 'what has 
happened in East Timor is the very opposite 
of good governance', Hon Mark Lennox-
James Gibbons, brother of killed New Zealander Kamal 
Bamadhaj, at a protest in London 
Boyd MP, the Foreign Office minister, 
insisted that the British government would 
only consider its position in the light of the 
Indonesian government's inquiry. The 
minister sought to divert attention from the 
British government's lack of action by 
referring to EC statements. 
On 25 November Lord Caithness told the 
House of Lords that the government had 'no 
plans to raise [the] issue with the UN 
secretary-general'. 
Two early day motions have been tabled 
in the House of Commons. One, tabled by 
Labour members of parliament Alice Mahon 
and Dawn Primarolo, calls for a British arms 
embargo on Indonesia and for the UN 
Security Council to discuss East Timor. The 
other, tabled by Conservative MP Hugh 
Dykes and which has received cross-party 
support, requests the Indonesian authorities 
to 'introduce a plan for East Timor's self-
determination'. 
The massacre was given wide coverage 
in the British media, with strong editorials 
appearing in The Times, the Guardian, the 
Independent on Sunday, the Observer, New 
Statesman and Society and the Catholic 
Herald. On Channel Four News, news 
presenter Jon Snow conducted a 20-minute 
feature on the massacre and its background, 
interviewing the Indonesian and Portuguese 
foreign ministers. 
On 10 December, Human Rights Day, 
during a demonstration held outside the 
Indonesian embassy in London, a letter from 
non-governmental organisations calling for 
an independent international inquiry under 
UN auspices was delivered to embassy staff 
by Ann Clwyd MP, shadow minister for 
overseas development of the opposition 
Labour Party, Alice Mahon MP, and James 
Gibbons, brother of New Zealander Kamal 
Bamadhaj, killed in the massacre. It was 
accompanied by lists of the MPs who had 
signed the early day motions in the House 
of Commons. 
United States 
The Bush administration, while regretting 
events in East Timor, has defended its 
military aid programme to the Suharto 
regime, worth US$2.3 million in 1991-92. 
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'We think that a continued and well focused 
military assistance p rogramme for Indonesia 
:>i can contribute to the professionalisation of 
the Indonesian military .... These kinds of 
programmes expose the trainee to 
democratic ideas and humanitarian 
standards,' claimed State Department 
spokesman Richard Boucher immediately 
after the massacre . 
In Congress, Democrat senator Claiborne 
Pell, chairman of the Senate foreign relations 
committee, and Republican Malcolm Wallop 
sponsored a resolution calling for a 
reassessment of all military training aid to 
Indonesia. 'It is time for our policy of 
implicitly accepting Indonesia 's 
incorporation of East Timor to be 
reviewed ... . The East Timorese deserve the 
right to decide their future under the aegis 
of a United Nations-sponsored referendum,' 
Pell said. 
Calling for an international solution to the 
conflict in East Timor and an independent 
inquiry into the massacre, the resolution 
requested the US ambassador in Jakarta to 
visit East Timor to conduct an investigation, 
as well as a report from the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture. It also called for the 
President to press the UN Commission on 
Human Rights to appoint a special 
rapporteur on East Timor and to pressure 
the Indonesian government to allow the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Summary and 
Arbitrary Executions to investigate human 
rights in both East Timor and Indonesia. 
Another resolution was also approved by 
the House of Representatives. 
On 27 November, at the instigation of 
Senator Wallop, a majority of the Senate 
sent a letter to President Bush, expressing 
concern at continuing atrocities in East 
Timor and stressing the issue of self-
determination. 
In a 18 December letter to Assistant 
Secretary of State for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs, Richard Schifter, 
Democrat representatives Tony Hall and 
Frank Wolf noted that US aid to Indonesia 
might be jeopardised by its conduct towards 
East Timor. (The United States is a major 
contributor to multilateral aid provided by 
the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia 
and worth US$4.75 billion in 1991.) 
Expressing alarm at the threat of Indonesian 
military chiefs to 'wipe out all separatist 
elements' after the official Indonesian 
inquiry, they called for international 
observers to be sent to protect the East 
Timorese. 
The strength of the reaction in the United 
States was helped by the fact that two US 
journalists had been present at the Santa 
Cruz massacre and badly beaten up by 
Indonesian troops. Their eye-witness 
accounts (from which we quote on pl-2) 
were given wide coverage and editorials 
on East Timor appeared in the Washington 
Post, the Boston Globe and the New York 
Times. 
In an editorial on 20 November, the 
Washington Post alerted the Bush 
administration to the strong stance taken 
by conservatives in the Senate and stated 
that Indonesia 'should treat the incident not 
simply as a public relations problem but as 
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the occasion to pull the thorn of East Timor, 
to ahandon an exercise in Third World 
colonialism that represents an abiding 
embarrassment to a country seeking respect 
and a \\'ider [international] role.· 
In a further editorial on 9 December, the 
\\ ashi11p,to11 Post. noting the Senate letter 
to President Bush, discussed the role that 
the l lnited States and other memhers of the 
international community could play: 
'Austra lia can make a special contrihution : 
suspend its [oil] agreement with Jakarta .... 
There must he a parallel effort to deal with 
the political roots of the problem. That 
means going beyond condemnation and 
impartial investigation and organising an 
expression of self-determination . The 
United Nations could do the job best. If 
Indonesia is right in claiming it has brought 
prosperity and light to East Timor, it would 
not fear a fair poll. President Bush, liberator 
of Kuwait, should make this his policy's 
priority .· 
Japan 
Japan, the largest aid donor to Indonesia 
(US$2.1 billion in 1990) and which does not 
have an official position on East Timorese 
self-determination, sent two officials to the 
territory to im·estigate massacre. 
In a statement on 20 November, the Diet 
(parliament) forum on East Timor, deploring 
the massacre and expressing fears for the 
safety of East Timorese in its wake, urged 
the government to take a clear stand and to 
revise its policy towards Indonesia with 
which Japan has close ties. 
Canada 
Canada , a major donor of aid and seller of 
arms to Indonesia , has traditionally trodden 
cautiously over East Timor. But following 
the massacre, Minister of External Affairs 
Barbara McDougall expressed Canadian 
shock to Indonesian foreign minister, Ali 
Alatas , at an Asia-Pacific Economic Co-
operation gathering in Seoul, and 
announced that Ottawa would review aid 
to Jakarta. 
On 9 December the Canadian 
government announced the suspension of 
development aid worth C$30 million . 
Wave of outrage sweeps 
Australian public 
Australia has long since been criticised 
as an accomplice of Indonesian 
occupation. But as PAT WALSH writes 
from Australia, the recent Santa Cruz 
massacre has had a profound impact 
on the Australian public, leading to 
pressure for a change in Canberra's 
stance. 
The response in Australia to the Dili killings 
has been so strong that the massacre could 
have happened here, such is the level of 
public empathy with East Timor. The wave 
of outrage has equalled that felt over recent 
incidents in Australia when crazed gunmen 
have shot down innocent citizens. 
The reaction has not just been due to 
long-standing public concern about East 
Timor, which successive Australian 
governments have failed to allay, hut to 
several new factors. 
Reopened debate 
Since the opening of East Timor in 1989, 
there has been a steady stream of Australian 
visitors to the territory , including journalists 
and church people, as well as a group of 
Austra lian parliamentarians which produced 
a critical report just \\·eeks before the 
massacre. All have reported on the heavy 
military presence and continued East 
Timorese aspirations for self-determination. 
Sr Helen Lombard, for instance, the 
Provincial of the Good Samaritan Order, 
who made her first visit in October 1991 , 
concluded that East Timor was 'an occupied 
country·. 
Concern that a crisis was developing in 
East Timor was further heightened by the 
last-minute cancellation of the Portuguese 
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delegation due in November. 
The massacre, witnessed by several 
foreigners, including Australians, had two 
immediate effects. It confirmed what many 
had been saying about the situation but had 
had difficulty sustaining; and it mobilised 
others who had reserved judgement but 
were now compelled by irrefutable 
evidence - strongly reported by the 
Australian media - to take a position. 
As a result , the event has crystallised the 
whole Timor tragedy, reopening a debate 
\vhich has waxed and waned in Australia 
m·erthe last 16 years. It has provided a focus 
of support for East Timor unlike any period 
since the Indonesian invasion in 1975. 
Church reaction 
The strength of the reaction has been best 
illustrated by the response of the Australian 
Catholic Church . Officially non-committal 
over East Timor for many years and 
constrained by Vatican policies, the 
Australian bishops have finally bitten the 
bullet. In a series of statements, they have 
condemned the massacre , called for a UN 
enquiry and, most significantly, urged a UN 
referendum in East Timar on independence. 
Many Australian bishops, including 
Cardinal Clancy, declared 7 December a day 
of national mourning and held masses 
which were attended by thousands of 
Catholics. In Canberra, the capital, 
Archbishop Carroll clearly broke ranks with 
the government by celebrating mass outside 
the Indonesian embassy where East 
Timorese, local activists and unions have 
maintained a non-stop vigil since the 
massacre and established an East Timorese 
embassy. At the cathedral in Melbourne, the 
Vicar-General condemned Australia 's 
'appeasement' of Indonesia and called for 
self-determination. 
Sideways move 
Much of the public's anger has been 
directed at the Australian government. In a 
book on foreign policy in the 1990s, 
published shortly before the massacre, the 
Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth 
Evans, made only two or three brief 
references to East Timor and said that 
Australia's relationship with Indonesia was 
now so solid that only a strong storm could 
shake it. But the storm of public opinion has 
put Canberra in a dilemma. 
Electorally shaky and populist, the Labour 
government has responded to public 
pressure by condemning the massacre. In 
mid-December Senator Evans was due to 
visit Jakarta , the Indonesian capital, to 
convey Australian disapproval to President 
Suharto. On the other hand, to protect its 
relationship with Indonesia, the government 
has sought to explain the massacre as a local 
military 'aberration' that cannot be attributed 
to Jakarta and to pin its hopes on the 
Indonesian inquiry. It has also refused to 
back up its condemnation with sanctions, 
despite widespread calls for at least military 
co-operation with Indonesia to be 
suspended. 
Canberra has also refused to review its 
recognition of Indonesia 's incorporation of 
East Timor. However, it has been forced to 
concede that East Timar, as Prime Minister 
Bob Hawke put it, is 'a running sore'. To 
heal this ulcer, the government is proposing 
new efforts at reconciliation between 
Indonesia and East Timor, including the 
resistance, and wants the international 
community and the UN secretary-general to 
play a part. 
This is a welcome shift in government 
thinking. But it is also clear that Australia 
wants the issue to be resolved internally so 
that Indonesia's 'sovereignty' is not 
challenged and the UN does not become too 
involved. The government fears that formal 
UN involvement might be used against 
Australia in the Internatienal Court of Justice 
where Portugal is contesting the legal status 
of the 1989 Timor Gap Treaty between 
Australia and Indon~sia for the joint 
development of oil and gas reserves in the 
Timor Sea. [As Timar Link went to press, the 
Australian government and Indonesia 
approved 11 oil production contracts.) 
Thus, despite the strength of public 
support for justice in East Timor, Australia 
is merely making a slight move sideways 
while leaving the essence of its policy on 
East Timor intact. This is regrettable. It fails 
to take into account the strength ofTimorese 
nationalism and will be read as weakness 
by the dominant hardliners in Indonesia . 
Most importantly it fails to take advantage 
of the excellent opportunity for a 
fundamental review of policy and will 
weaken support for a concerted 
international initiative which is essential if a 
lasting settlement is to be found . 
Pat Walsh is director of the Australian 
Council for Overseas Aid's human rights 
programme 
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Church under pressure Defender of 
the people 
The Catholic Church in East Timor has 
played a key role in publicising human 
rights abuses and offering protection 
to the occupied territory's population. 
In recent months it has faced increasing 
threats and the pressure from the 
Indonesian authorities has continued 
since the Santa Cruz massacre. 
The Church has often given young people 
shelter in its buildings when they have 
feared for their lives and several youths 
were staying in Motael Church on 28 
October when Indonesian troops shot 
Sebastiao Gomes dead in the early hours of 
the morning. It was this incident which 
sparked the events leading to the Santa Cruz 
massacre almost a fortnight later. 
In protest at Gomes' murder, the 
Apostolic Administrator, Bishop Carlos 
Belo, refused an invitation to attend a 
meeting of the Indonesian Bishops ' 
Conference in Jakarta. And, in spite of 
pressure from the military, he issued a 
statement to clarify the Motael Church 
incident, rejecting reports in the Indonesian 
media which blamed the Church. 
Belo's statement pointed to the late-night 
presence during the previous week of 
unknown 'individuals on motor-cycles' in 
the vicinity of the church. Normally, 'only 
police, military and intelligence agents ' kept 
watch. 
Belo also stated that he had given his 
permission for the parish priest's residence 
and the church to be searched after 6am. 
Anti-Indonesian pamphlets, Fretilin and 
Portuguese flags and a number of knives, 
sticks and iron bars had been found - but 
in the house of domestic staff, and 'not in 
the church, as had been tendentiously 
broadcast'. Eighteen people had been 
handed over to the police. 
In an interview with the head of public 
relations of the Indonesian Bishops ' 
Conference, Fr Alberto Ricardo, the parish 
priest of Motael Church and vicar general 
of Dili diocese , said that it would be 
impermissible to turn away young people 
seeking the protection of the Church. 'It is 
my duty to help those of my sheep who 
have gone astray and are in difficulty. ' He 
also denied that the church had been used 
for political ends and that flags and weapons 
had been found there. 
Following the massacre on 12 November, 
Bishop Belo gave refuge to 257 young East 
Timorese and personally accompanied 
others back to their homes. He had counted 
89 young men with bullet or stab wounds 
in the local military hospital and referred to 
the stabbing of an army officer during the 
clashes. This , he believed, could have 
sparked the soldiers' fury. 
Since the Motael incident on 28 October, 
Belo has been without the use of a 
telephone and cut off from the rest of the 
world. 'It is not a coincidence. Every time 
there is a special event here, my phone does 
not work.' He had written to the governor 
of East Timar, Mario Carrascalao, saying 
that the Motael incident was the result of 
provocation by the authorities and that one 
of the two victims was a known collaborator 
of the Indonesian security agency. He had 
not received any letter from the Vatican or 
from the Apostolic Nunciature in Jakarta . 
Since the massacre church sources in East 
Timor have spoken of an atmosphere of 
terror worse than at any time since the 1975 
invasion. Witnesses of the massacre and the 
injured who had been too afraid to seek 
medical treatment were being rounded up . 
Extra-judicial executions, torture and rape 
were still occurring on a daily basis and 
leaders of the Catholic Church, including 
Bishop Belo, were heing threatened. Fr 
Ricardo has been brutally interrogated on a 
number of occasions. Reports in mid-
December pointed to continual surveillance 
of the clergy and told of priests being 
interrogated for up to seven hours without 
interruption. 
Bishop Belo has appealed to the United 
States to intervene as the Indonesian 
campaign of 'refined psychological 
harassment' continues. Repression is aimed 
at turning one Timorese against another and 
the speaking of Portuguese is treated as a 
crime against the state. Despite the 
intimidation, Belo has vowed to 'suffer in 
joy' with his people in the search for a 
peaceful solution to the country's problems. I 
Appointed Apostolic Administrator of 
Dili diocese eight years ago at the age of 
35, Bishop Belo has repeatedly 
denounced Indonesian human rights 
violations and spoken out against 
Jakarta 's attempts to destroy East 
Timorese language and culture. 
Portugal is regarded by the United 
Nations as the administering authority of 
East Timar, and the Vatican, which has 
not recognised Indonesia's annexation 
of the territory, runs Dili diocese from 
Rome. 
Bishop Belo works in difficult 
circumstances. He is caught between the 
demands of his people for independence 
and church protection and the pressure 
from sectors within the Church to 'keep 
out of politics ' and accept the 
incorporation of the Timorese church 
into Indo nesian structures. Belo faces the 
daily reality of a repressive military 
occupation, as well as the threat to his 
personal safety that this involves. 
Foreign bishops rally 
to Timar church 
The atmosphere of fear and intimidation in 
East Timar had been rising long before the 
Santa Cruz massacre. In October Bishop 
Belo spoke on Portuguese radio of his fears 
for the Timorese people during the 
forthcoming v1s1t of the Portuguese 
parliamentarians, saying that the military 
had threatened to shoot the people if they 
approached the visitors. 
Reports were also received of attacks on 
Catholic churches , with casualties in 
Maliana, Suai, and Fatumaca. In response, 
64 Catholic and Protestant bishops from 
around the world wrote to the UN secretary-
general , Javier Perez de Cuellar, requesting 
him to take steps to guarantee the safety of 
the Timorese people during and after the 
Portuguese delegation's visit and to install a 
UN team of observers to monitor human 
rights after its departure. 
In the wake of the Santa Cruz massacre , 
bishops ' conferences around the world 
reacted to give support to the beleaguered 
church in East Timor. 
Indonesia 
Significantly, the Indonesian Catholic 
Bishops' Conference issued a statement, 
jointly signed by chairman Archbishop 
Julius Darmaatmadja of Semarang and 
secretary Capuchin Bishop Martinus Dogma 
Situmorang of Padang. Stressing that 'the 
Church is not a political organisation that 
can determine the political activities of its 
members ', it 'deeply regretted the incident', 
urged all parties to settle the matter 'through 
judicial process' and to be 'calm and wise 
and not to be influenced by rumours which 
could worsen the situation. ' 
Subsequently, a fact-finding team sent by 
the Indonesian bishops to East Timor 
blamed the Indonesian military for the 
massacre, establishing that over 100 people 
had been killed instead of the official 
Indonesian figure of 19. 
In a follow-up statement, the mission 
expressed solidarity with the Timorese 
Church and their 'deep regret that because 
of the actions of some members of the 
armed forces, the moral integrity, dignity , 
and credibility of the nation has been put 
at risk in the eyes of the world, of our own 
country, and even more so, of the people 
of East Timor, a people to whom we should 
be reaching out' . This was the first time that 
the Indonesian bishops had taken such a 
clear stance on East Timor. 
Japan 
In a letter of support to Bishop Belo on 12 
December, the Japanese Catholic Bishops' 
Conference called for the right of the 
Timorese people to self-determination, 
expressing 'our strong support for your 
demand for a referendum as presented by 
your Excellency to the secretary-general of 
the United Nations in February 1989. 
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·\\ ·e urge the United "<ations to carry out 
a thorough inn~stigation of this incident and 
do its best to find a total solution to the East 
Timor problem. 
Japan occupied East Timor for three years 
and a half during the Second \\ .arid War and 
destroyed its beautiful Cathedral. We 
remember this crime committed by our 
nation and sincerely repent of this action. 
Because of this sad history \\ e feel a very 
strong solidarity with you .' 
England, Wales and Ireland 
The Bishops' Conference of England and 
Wales issued a statement expressing sorrow 
and outrage at the deaths in Dili , extending 
solidarity to Bishop Belo. It called on the 
'international community, and especially the 
United Nations, Portugal and Indonesia to 
seek urgently a just and lasting solution to 
the status of East Timar based on the free 
cho ice of the Timorese people'. 
In Ireland, a statement by Bishop Eamonn 
Casey, chairman of Irish Catholic aid 
agency, Tr6caire, condemned Indonesian 
policies as 'close to genocidal' and ca lled 
on the Irish government to make representa-
tions in the UN and the European 
Community for the massacre and human 
rights abuses to be investigated by an 
international commission. 
The Vatican 
On 10 December Pope John Paul II sent 
Archbishop Giovanni De Andrea, a high 
ranking Vatican diplomat , to East Timar in 
order to assist the local church and to 'listen 
and encourage' . This was the first time the 
Timorese Church had received the 
consolation and encouragement of a visiting 
Vatican diplomat. · 
A life of 
constant fear 
Catholic aid worker CIARE DIXON 
returned to the UK from Dill on the 
morning of the Santa Crnz massacre. 
She had visited East Timor in response 
to appeals for foreign observers to be 
present in the run-up to the visit of the 
Portuguese delegation. She describes 
the atmosphere in Dill. 
Timorese live in constant fear of night and 
day raids on their homes, and of torture if 
they are suspected of pro-independence 
sympathies. The remotest villages have been 
scoured for potential political opponents 
and execution promised to anyone who 
might try to speak to members of the 
Portuguese delegation. 
When I arrived in East Timar the 
atmosphere was highly-charged. It is 
impossible for a European to blend into the 
crowd in East Timar - foreigners are rare 
and even now there are many children who 
have never seen white skin before. 
Heavy presence 
Everywhere I went I was aware of being 
watched or followed. After my first night at 
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a small family-run boarding house on the 
outskirts of Dili I decided it was better to 
lea\'t' for a ·safer' hotel in the centre of town . 
Apparently, police and agents of Intel had 
kept overnight "' ·~1tch and sent spies into the 
hostel to find out \Yho I was. On my second 
day the local police commander turned up 
to find out where I was from and what I was 
doing there. I felt my hosts would be safer 
if I left. 
Numerous visits to military dictatorships 
in Latin America had made me think that I 
was used to living in situations of tension. 
East Timor brought a new dimension 
altogether. No one knows just how heavy 
the military presence is in East Timar but 
Bishop Belo estimates it between 45,000 and 
50,000 troops. In addition the bishop says 
that 'half the population is paid to spy on 
the other half' . 
If we take his figures then there are 
proportionately ten times as many troops in 
East Timar per head of population as in El 
Salvador. In El Salvador there is a civil war 
whilst in East Timar the Indonesians claim 
that in the last two years they have reduced 
the armed resistance from 200 to just 50 
men, and that the Timorese are perfectly 
happy to be part of Indonesia. 
Viewed with suspicion 
Communication was difficult. Although East 
Timar was a Portuguese colony for four 
centuries, the Indonesians have banned the 
teaching of Portuguese in schools. Only one 
school, run by the church, has the temerity 
to offer this subject and has been starved of 
finance as a result. Any foreigner who 
speaks Portuguese is suspected by the 
Indonesians of pro-independence sym-
pathies and so I was warned repeatedly only 
to speak the language to people linked to 
the church whom I could trust. All traces of 
Portuguese have been erased -- the only 
display of the language I saw was the 
memorial of the diocese of Dili's golden 
jubilee. 
The church itself is viewed with open 
suspicion by the Indonesians. It is the last 
\·isible vestige of East Timor's heritage and 
since 1975 the Catholic populJtion has 
swollen from around 40 to almost 90 per 
cent of Timorese. Days before my arriva l 
on the island troops had stormed the parish 
church of Motael. 
Wherever I travelled I was subject to 
questioning by the military and the police 
-- just a sampler of what people in Timar 
experience every day. On a visit to a 
provincial town , I received a message from 
the community of sisters with whom I was 
to spend the night. They begged me not to 
go to their convent or try to make contact 
with them as they were too frightened of 
reprisals from the military if they were seen 
to be talking to a foreigner. The priests there 
told me that they had received warnings 
that 'their graves were ready' if they tried to 
make contact with the Portuguese 
delegation . 
'Hard to be Christian' 
On the same day I watched as four 
frightened 15 year olds were hauled from 
their church-run school for interrogation by 
the police. Their crime? They had refused 
to sing the Indonesian national anthem at 
the school's weekly flag-raising ceremony 
and so their Indonesian teachers , after 
physically assau lting them, called in the 
police. 
'It is so hard to be a Christian here ' said 
one Timorese priest. 'we know that we have 
to love our enemies, but how do we 
reconcile that with the hatred and bitterness 
we have endured over these years'' 
Bishop Belo knows the church lives with 
danger. As we sat on the verandah of his 
house, he pointed out the intelligence 
agents posted constantly at the entrance to 
his garden. Although by nature and 
experience he is a cautious man, there was 
no hesitation in his response to my question 
as to what he considered the most important 
sign of support that the church outside East 
Timar could make: 'You must work to get 
the troops withdrawn'. Not an easy 
proposition in the face of indifference on a 
massive scale from the international 
community. 
There is a touching faith among all those 
Timorese I met that their plight must stir the 
world 's conscience and that they will some 
day be able to live in freedom , peace and 
independence. They are a gentle and 
peaceful people, the kind that , according 
to the Bible, will inherit the earth. Their 
greatest fear is that , after the routine 
expressions of moral outrage at the 
massacre , governments throughout the 
world will once more conveniently forget 
the same principles which compelled them, 
earlier in 1991 , to go to war to prove that 
large and powerful nations cannot expect 
to invade, annex and s115jugate small weak 
nations and get away with it. 
The above is an edited extract of Clare 
Dixon 's article, 'Cry of a forgotten land ', 
published in the Catholic Herald of 22 
November 1991 
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